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ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE 
ROGER J. TRAYNOR: The Pope 
John lecturer at the Catholic Univer· 
sity of America this year was none 
other than Chief Justice Roger J. Tray. 
nor of the Supreme Court of Califor. 
nia. Admiral F. Trowbridge vom Baur 
(who was promoted from commodore 
to admiral by his frienos when he be· 
came General Coun!'d of the Navy duro 
ing the Eisenhower Administration, 
even though his only ship is a sailboat 
at Kennebunk Port) convened a spe· 
cial luncheon of the Milkweed March. 
ing and ChO\\"flcr Society in Roger's 
honor at the 1\ ,tI ional Lawyers's Club. 
Some forty Wa~hin~ton lawyers, Chief 
Justice Warren and Judges Burger, 
uv('nthal nllIl Rohin~on of the Court 
of Appeals for the \li~trict of Columbia 
Circuit allended. 
In the evcning (hid Ju!'tice Traynor 
~a\'e hi!! alillre!'!' on the uni\'er!'ity cam· 
pu~, I'hoo~in~ u!' hi" topiG "Statutes ne· 
volving in Common·Law Orhits". 
You ohtain a copy hy writing the 
Catholic Uni\'er!lity of America, Wash· 
in;.:ton, D. C. 20017, and asking for the 
Summer, IIJGfl, is!!ue (17 Catholic Uni. 
vcrsity {Jaw Rcvicw 401, S2.00). 
To Traynor, Pope John is "one of 
the great men of our time". His "noble 
example" renews "faith everywhere in 
the world that human beings can reo 
solve their problems with reasoning 
humanity" and, therefore, his "vision" 
encompas!'es "a context of legc ct 
gregc, of rules in relation to people". 
Statutes "are of infinite variety in 
purpose", and "legislators innovate 
them w.ith a freedom unknown to 
judges, who mu~t ordinarily stay 
within the confines of precedent and 
articulate the reasons for their rules". 
The "hydrnheaded prohlem" for the 
poor judge who makes use of statutes 
"i!' how to synchronize" these "un· 
guided missiles launched by legisla. 
tures with a going system of common 
law". 
Because the volume of lawmaking is 
now so great, we "no longer can allord 
to have judges retreat into formulism, 
as they have recurringly done in the 
past to shield wooocn precedents from 
any radiations of forwarcl·looking stat· 
utes", while they ignore the "dry rot in 
the precedents themselves". 
Recognizing that "such spells of for· 
mulism in the law come and ~o, in· 
duced by shifts in politics and philoso. 
phy", Chief Justi ce Traynor' contends, 
as did l1oseoe Pound, James Landis 
a'nd William Page before him, that 
"for lIlany centuries j uclges ha\'e been 
accomodating statutes to the common 
law openly or indir~rtly, expansively 
or warily". These and other scholars 
have heen "piecing together fragments 
of old records to yield a chronicle of 
what might today he called the con· 
glomerate merger" • I judicial rules and 
statutes". 
Long before the Ili!ICovery of Amer· 
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ir:a the En;: I i,h I:(,urt~ m;-e.jc u'c of ~tat· 
utes to develop thc cOI"",on law },y a 
"sweetly namcer' an(1 "imaginatiH~ ly 
conccived "doctrinc calbl "the C(luity 
of the ~tatllte". 
The rl!~i~tance of the law tt) chan;!c 
heing what it is, the chief ju~tice as-
!!urcs us the "it was not the a,'era~e an· 
cestor·judge who took the initiati,·e in 
the !!earch for the edelweiss, the rare 
decision whose center rea!oning 
emerges to dominate its woolly con· 
lext". The judge who thus used a stat· 
ute to decide a point not covered br it 
neecled to il1\'oke "5ueh magic words as 
equity oj tire $Ialute". 
The doctrine of the efjuity of the 
statute became "8 double-edged de· 
vice" that enabled common law jUllges 
to write exceptions into loose 5tatutory 
generalizations and hrin;; within the 
reach of the statute situations that ad· 
mittedly lay without its exprcss term~. 
A judge who feared Blackstone and 
did not wish to be caught "en~a~ed in 
lawmaking", not deeming himself "a 
piece of the action", would "sprin;; to 
life when a statutc bearing on the ea~c 
before him came into ,·iew". Then, you 
see, he "would not he stepping beyond 
the bounds of his own domain". 
Suppose. for example. a statute bear· 
ing a phra~e like X numb", r of )'(,3r5. 
l'prcifyinl! that it shall apply to A an.! 
B and clearly IInconcerne.! with any· 
one el~e. Why not an equi-·al ent rule 
for C? the Judge mi~ht ask him <e lf. 
when there is a pcrplexing C hdure 
the court who apprars to he a lillie 
cousin, if not the sihling of A and n. 
Whatever this eOllrageous jud;;e 
"chose. to call his method, he would hc 
creating law with a capital C". Though 
ostensibly "acting under the infiuence 
of a statute", the "rule he created was 
his own". 
Chief Justice Traynor finels that "far 
back in time, when lihraries were not 
yet creaking under thc w('i ~ht of law 
tOIllCS, the chalty Year llooks werc re· 
plete with ercati,'e lawmaking in the 
courts on the ba~i5 of statutes". In 
truth, he concludes that "J udges U5etl 
the eyes at the back of Iheir heads to 
note statutory rules as a "ouree for an· 
alogous decisions." 
For instance, in 1 :m;) a Year Book 


















Holrlsworth,-lJis{ory 0/ Ellglish Law 
169, 3d ed. 1923) tells us that 
Hugo and other~, wilh the whole 
county and the King'~ tennnts o( the 
,·i1l and land o( Montgomery ~ued E. 
de Morluomari (or that he hnd cle· 
(orcrd 1 hem of their common of pas· 
ture in L., thrir free chase nnd fishery 
throllj:lwut the whole o( Sahrina. and 
of nil their ~trenms in the land o( K. 
Traynor comments on this pleading 
that neither the "most indilTerent" nor 
"the dullest J udgc" could . turn "a deaf 
ear to such a huc and cry" and remain 
"unmoved . by the visions of Jlugo and 
others turned back in a pasture thcy 
regularly traversed", halted "on their 
customary free chasc throu~h Sabrina, 
commandrd to lay down their fishing 
rods" and "abruptly barred from the 
use of their familiar streams". 
How to give relief? 
The judges did so by noting that in 
the ple;Hling Hu~o and his friends al· 
le~ed that they had enjoyed the uses in 
qurstioJl "from before tire lime 0/ 
memo·ry". This they readily equated 
"with the year 1139, when Richard the 
Lionhearted acceded to the throne and 
held that a continuous use since that 
year would be conclusively presumed 
to be of lawful or::;in". 
The judges "fastened lIpon the year 
I W9 by analogy to the Statute of 
Westminster I (1295) which specificd 
that year as marking the limit of time 
in which a plaintilT in a Writ of ni~ht 
could trace his titlc". But as the chief 
justice sayi', "it took judicial imagina. 
tion" to see a statute marking title to 
property as likewise appropriate to 
mark a right to an eai'ement; more es· 
pecially when 106 years stretched be· 
tween thc marking year 1139 and the 
date of the statute, 1295. 
When it became impractical to prove 
continuolls use hack to 1 Hl9, our courts 
in "the late ci;o l.teenth century" began 
to "accept prouf of twenty years of 
continuous use to buttress a plea · of 
a fictional lost grant". The twenty·year 
period came from a statute of James I 
that the courts had prev.iously held to 
be "applicable to actions of eject. 
ment". 
In 1623 there was a statute of limita· 
tion covering "a range of common law 
writs". In 17()7, 141 years later, "Lord 
Camden heard a plea to set aside a 
clearly erroneous thirty.year old de-
cree". His Lordship evaded (Iecision by 
recourse to "the statute that barred any 
action on a Bill of Error at common 
law after twenty years". 
Similarly, in missing person cases, 
by analogy to early statutes, our courts 
have gradually fixed on "an unex· 
plained absence of more than seven 
years" as creating a presumption of 
death. 
Likewise, "the origins of the of-
fense of conspiracy" are in the "Third 
Ordinance of Conspirators enacted in 
1301 in the reign of Edward I, Long. 
shanks", which prohibited "confedera-
cies for the false aIHI malicious proeure. 
ment of indictments". Ultimately, by 
expansive interpretation of this statute, 
"the judges wrote into the common law 
the generalization that an agreement to 
commit any crime was a criminal con· 
. " splTacy • 
Roger Traynor helieves .it to be "one 
of the gentle ironies that the mother 
country's most unruly children, the 
American colonists, founded a govern· 
~ent whose courts would rely at first 
primarily on the parental rules in its 
legal matters". Bllt "when the colonies 
became the United States, parental 
rules were in c. reasingly subj ec t to in· 
spection at the border to determine 
their adaptability to the native soil". 
States dilTered 1I~ 10 their willingne1's 
to receive either P, itish common law 
or statutes. "SOIIII ' courts recognized 
only statutes that had either codified 
the Common law or had been a!~imi­
lated into it." for instance, in W13 
Ohio did this in a real estate ca-c 
(Crawford v. Clwpman, 17 Ohio 
449, 453) because the English statute 
in question there had some three cen· 
turies earlier abolished "the Common 
law rule that choses in action were not 
assignable". By so doing, the statute 
"remained forever a stranger to the 
common law" and was not "part and 
parcel of it". 
Apparently. Chief Justice Traynor 
has visited Ohio becau~e he remarks 
that "In Ohio one did not take chances 
with such innovation, even thou~h its 
respectable place in English law for 
more than three hundred years sug· 
gested that it had lon~ since been as· 
siniilated into the (;omll1on law." 
But most courts, Roger assurcs us, 
"received English statutes, including 
this one, more hospitably". 
For instance, "there was a disposi. 
tion to receive English statutes enacted 
before 1776 as part of the common 
law, suhject to such tests of relcvance 
and propriety as were applicahlc to 
judge-made rules". "The prrponderant 
v.iew was that indic:cnous law could not 
assimilate any Enc:lish rule inconsist· 
cnt with its own rules or repugnant to 
its tenor." 
But judges in California and c1~e­
where "saw no rra~nn why they should 
limit reception to 'the ancient and fre· 
quently most barbarous rules and cu:,,· 
toms of the common law', and in so 
doing refused to take into account the 
mit igation of their harshness and the 
broadening of the rulrs themselves 
which followed the !,\lII'cessive enact· 
ments of the En~lish ~llIllItes". 
Aceordingly, Cali fornia courts "re· 
jected early the Statutes of Enroll-
Octobcr, 1968 • Volumc 54 1031 
ments", rejected also the Statute of 
l iscs "ins .. far as it purported to vest 
lel.!al title in the cestui que trust", and 
when dcaling, with the Statute of Eliza· 
l>l'lh, "perillitting enforcemcnt of char· 
itaLic Irml~, they took care tu note that 
it was not 'technically adopted', since 
its procedllres were 'totally inappli. 
caLle to \Jur social or political con· 
dition' ". 
"American judges were compelled to 
playa far more creative role in the law 
than their English contemporaries and 
as time wcnt on there would be no end 
to the creativity required to meet the 
novel prol,lems of a rapidly growing 
economy." Compare Blackstone, who 
had among other things "made it plain 
that 'the husband and wife [became] 
one person in law', and then made it 
plainer that the wife was not the one". 
But "who today would condemn his 
mother or sister, let alone his wife or 
daughter, to banishment in the world 
of Blackst"ne?" 
As we all know, it took the married 
WOlnell's ~tatules for women to be 
"recognized as people" and a constitu· 
ticmal amcndlllent 10 perlllit them to 
vole. As Hoger Traynor says, "there 
wcre alJullllant legal rules to keep her 
in ordcr as the zero in oneness" and 
the new statutes were ncedcd "to give 
ilnjlctus to Ilew j udgc-made rulcs" to 
free her. 
To gi ve some idea how long it takes 
for courb to rid our law of formulistic 
rules, the t:hicf justice tells us that it 
\,as not ulilil 1 'JG], Illat California was 
able to O\'C'I rule all ] :~:y) decisi(JII "tllat 
there cOlJld be Ill) c(JIIsl'iracy J,dwc:c'n 
Jlu,IJiJlld ." .. 1 wife". J Ie rejoices in tell-
ing u~ tl'_11 ill Cdif'JfIlia Il)day, "Thc 
fic;ti(Hlal lJ"ity of llU~b<AIHI <And wife has 
bcen substantially vitiatc!l by over. 
whelming evidence that one plus one 
adds up to two, even in twogether. 
ness." (Cali/orllia v.Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 
871), 8UO, 395 1'. 2d 3'J3, 8')4- (1964) • 
•• "Two years earlier, in the appropri. 
ately.named case of Scli v. Scli. [53 
Cal. 2d 633, 376 P. 2d 65 (1962)] the 
court ruled that onc spouse Illay reo 
cover against unother in tort." 
Of course, in thc conspiracy case the 
court hall "tu reckon with the argue 
ment that it sllUulcJ leave any new rule 
to the legislaturc since its old rule had 
endured so long". This is an argument 
which "dies hard becuuse old age tends 
to command respcct and we arc likely 
to ignore that many an olll rule has 
survived in u comatose state, some. 
times from the outset, because its vital· 
ity has not been tested by the rigors of 
I· - . " "A ~~. I new ItlgatlOn • v 'ClIe e en. 
sues. for the longer a rule exists, the 
more likely it is to discourage such 
testing." 
In California v. Pierce, Traynor tells 
us, his court was "confronted with a 
moribund rule that was patently ,mait· 
ing a coup de grace". IIis court ob· 
liged, noting tlrat "the rule ha!1 been 
judicially created in the first place and 
hence it would he inappropriate to 
await its undoing by the legislature". 
The chief justice acknowledges that 
while "it has taken doing and re· 
doing", nevertheless down through the 
years judges "have thus lIlnplific:d thc 
range allll steadied the course of sUl'h 
legislative mis~iles as Married Women's 
Statutcs". 
Turning then to "the penal or regu· 
latory statutes constructed to specific 
standards of <.unduet", Hoger Traynor 
find~ tllat COlli I. have 110 dillic 'ulty in 
ca~es in\'olvill:- di,.,:cl vi"latiolls; tile 
"judicial gui,I,II ... c" prul,lelll is 110t 
with IIII! ~I,,''''''~ tlwlll si-Ive" hilt, 
rather "wilh nil the: unidentified flying 
objects that d" ""I cOllie strictly within 
] O:~3 AJlII!rican llur A!;!;ociution Journlll 
their oriJit". Particularly in civil cases 
on negligcnce, judges "have still to 
make optimum use of penal or regula. 
tory statutes". 
In Sa((erlee v. Orange Glen School 
Dis/riel. 29 Cal. 2d 531, 177 P. 2d 279 
(l 9.J7), there were "large differences 
of judicial opinion". One was that the 
violation of a penal statute was merely 
evidence of negligence, another, that it 
was a relJutt"hle presumption of QeC;li-
gellce. Traynor's own view was "and 
still is, that the statutory standard , for 
penal liability was the appropriate one 
for civil liability and hence that a vio-
latioll of the statute was negligence per 
" se • 
ny instructing a jury under the 
standard of the penal statute, the trial 
judge "guides the flying objects of 
civil litigation on a course that can be 
ratiolwlly synchronized with that of 
the pilut penal statute". 
In the chief's view, "It would be 
wastef ul for courts not to utilize such 
statutory materials when they are so 
readily available for analogy as well as 
for adoption." Particularly, "statutes 
that protcct specified classes of people 
frolll specifled ri~ks" are "rich sources 
of analugy". "It is logic run riot" to 
arguc "that a statute re<Jlliring the bar-
rieadill g of an open well or elevator 
shaft for Ihe protection of emplo}'ee~ 
canll"t, by virtue of its particularity. 
bc invoked for the protection of any 
others." 
Alld Rop:er TruYllor then remarks 
with that beautiful liquid prose of his, 
so rl'mini~ccllt of tlat' ~entle, loving 
nenjalllill Cardozo: "The well alH1 the 
elevator shaft !lnt! the busy inter:,oectiull 
IIptly illustJ'<Ite a first·grade readcr 011 
the mounting interactions of human 
ent( ~ rprise, the llIC11l1ltillg statutes tlwt 
~o\'c-nr ~uch t'ntl'fl'ri~t-, IIllcl the moullt· 
illg u,.,c thal juclgc-s Illake of statuks 
that ~l'ill ill 1"II;.o..tra\l-lled orbits of 
COIIIIII"" law." 
Though !lUllle ilia), lltill helieve there 
is a "great di~tance between seemingly 
immovahle precedents and secmingly 
irrt'~i~tihle ~tatutes", Justice Traynor 
says "the twain are always meP.ling in 
the courl room", c!'peeially in Califor· 
nia which "ahounds with judicial pre· 
cl'dl'llts, snnwt imes as old as the gohl 
frolll its hills but sometimes dated in 
lhcir cxpcrience". 
He puts thi~ case: 
TI ... .!c'('f'a-('d i\Iary Ilncl (,)(('(,III('cl a 
will le;l\"inl! her IInllle and Illllsi of ils 
('nlll(,l1l ~ In Ih t' mill lin of IInl"'rl if ~he 
wc're livilli! In n'cc' ivc Ihe h(''1I1C'~I; if 
nnl, il w(lilid 1!<1 In Hnhert. Blllle'rl's 
IIIIItlH'r pred. 'C ('a-,'d Ihc~ h'-Ialrix, Sc'v. 
('1',,1 year, afln i\lury c'xC'(,lItc,cllH'r will 
~hc' llC'camc m!'nlally inc.'"IlI,,'IC'llt and 
a hank wa~ "I'puintf'd ~lIl1rclian nf IlC'r 
c'Iate, With COlirt IIppr<lvul. til!' !!lIl1rd· 
ian ~nld ]\lar),\ Ilfllllf! ftIT $21,000 1I11c1 
kept Ihe proceed .. in II "'parat" IIC" 
cnllnt. It ~I'c'nl IIf 'ady ull til" Jll'lIcc'f'd~ 
10 ~lIppflrl Mary, wllet rc'lliaillf'cI ill('OIIl' 
IlI'tenl In hn dyill/.: tlay, It Ic,ft inlllcl 
nearly sewn Ihlln~and dC)llur~ in Ihe 
1',,1 ale Ihal " 'ere nol [lUl't of Ihc~c [lro· 
ceeds, 
The quc~tion was whether Hobert 
could gel thal residlle in jlartial reslo· 
ration of hi!' own nearly extin;':lIi!'llt'd 
specific gifl. A "(]()c trine of aclc ~mp. 
tion mollified with a smidgen of Lalin 
was nol equal to a guardianship case. 
Whatever its decejltively reasonahle 
sOllnd, pro tanto ailr.Jllplion , like plain 
adC'mpl ion was hOllnd to operatc errati· 
cally a~ well a~ llarshl),," Of Ihe S21 ,000 
the bank recei\'cd frolll tlte salc of noll· 
crt's hou~e, bllt S!l.l!l,(j(, remained. 
"Over twclve limr~ thllt SUIll rcmained 
inlact to he clainwel n~ a rl'~idue, Pro 
lanto was hardly pro I .. -.no Rollerto." 
Tholl;.:h ~ilcnt 011 III(' poinl hdore 
Ihe court, Chief JlIstif'l~ Traynor in the 
!Ieci!'ion of Ihi!' rasc f""nd California's 
Prnhatc Coele of ~r(,111 valuc, lt~ rules 
a~ to thc ahnlcnH'nl of tl'~lnlllcnlnry 
;.:ifts mitigall! "I he nelveJ'l'c con~c· 
CJIJCllcr!\ 10 a speci IiI: ,Ic'vi~cc or le;.:atee 
whcn n ;.:i ft intellelrd f .. r him and nevrr 
rt'\'okl'cl hy the (1011 or" i~ w'I'd "10 Illel'! 
dlllrgc' ~ IIgaill~t Ihc~ t'·I"I,,", Wh)' 11111 u 
t'''lIIl'arlll,J, ~ rille ill 1I li"l~ !Oillintioll ex· 
1"'1't Ihal III 1I II Ilg«: IIIC'II I "f till' t'~IIIII~ WII!! 
rlltru~tt ~ tl to a ~uIIT(lillll ratltl!r than 10 
lin cXI'eulor? "Sweet LIre the uses of 
advcr!'ity, but sweeter IItill when 
shared." 
The moral: 
Wlwn II jllllicial rule i~ Ihlls mod· 
eliI'd aftl~r II ~Ialulnry filII", the very 
fact IOf cn"yin~ ~i/.:lciti('~ Ihlll it is not 
In III' rfl,d"., 'd wilh intnprrllllinn Ihlll 
clarifi('~ "" f)h~cllre ~I"llII(' or IImplifiC'!\ 
a "kdelul one. SlIrh u juclieiul rule 
- . 
takes on a life of il~ own in Ihe com· 
mon law. It can prove endlc~ ~I)' u<dlll 
wilhin ils own orbit alld may e"cn 
serve as a modcl ilself /flr 5uccessh'e 
judge·made rule~, 
Even judges "who rcsi-I reaclin;; up 
on any law out~ide that i,,~crihcd on 
thcir own caves", rnn~1I1t Ihe uniform 
act!l of the National (onf"lrnre Corn· 
mi!l~ioner!l on l ' niform ~Iate Laws. 
When Ihe "formidahle" Ulliform Com· 
meT(~ ial Code "begins It, rcvoh'e in 
('ollllllon·law orhil!', it tlramalically 
l ' oml'd~ evrn tho~e who /IIay hitherto 
h,l\'1! bec'lI IInhecding to ""Ie that in 
tlll~ \':II'~lIard as well as ill the wake 
of ~lIch a sk),lllark Ihere a n ! many le~s 
I'pectaeular planets". COUI ts have fol· 
lowed U.C.C. provisions even though 
the code has not yet hcen enacted in 
their jurisdictions. Like Ihe Restate· 
ments, Ihe code has "the l'tamp of ap-
proval of a large body of American 
IIchola rl'hil'''. 
Thank!l to Henry Frirn,lIy's deci!'ion 
in Vnitell Slalcl v. rr' egcIII,,'ic Corpo. 
ration. ~~60 F. 2d 6U, (,7Ct (2<1 Cir. 




1966), "the Uniform Commercial Code 
has become a major influence in the 
development of common law in the fed· 
eral courts to govern cases involving 
go\'ernment contracts and othcr com· 
mercial transactions". It has become 
"a source of federal law", and Judge 
Friendly has noted that it is "well on 
its way to becoming a truly nalional 
law of commerce". 
Even the "diehard judge", resistant 
to the use of statutes in the formula-
tion of common law rules, can hardly 
ignore the rich source of law in the 
Uniform Commercial Code so that 
by analogy in case after case in both 
state and federal courts we have seen 
the U.C.C. revolving in orbit to create 
new law in areas where it has no direct 
or official application. 
Of course, it is "only when a case is 
not governed by a statute" that a court 
is "free to work out its own solution". 
But once it formulates "a rule by anal· 
ogy from a statutory rule, it creates a 
precedent of the same force as any 
other", which "may endure for genera-
tions or succumb to rapid obsoles-
cence". 
As Roger Traynor says. "The real 
proI.lem is not whether Judges should 
.Hlke use of statutes, but how they can 
make optimum use of them." 
In answering thi!!, he calls attention 
to the need for a national "Ministry of 
Justice" that would collect and study 
statutes and assist the Congress in na-
tional law reform. "Until 'there are 
signs of a much closer watch on the 
legislative process than we now have," ! 
Chief Justice Traynor asks, as do I, I 
"What are we to think of the enigmatic ' 
aphorism that ours is a government of 
laws and not of men?" 
His answer is that, 
H the lihrarians and re~earchers 
will ~y~lemali7.e the ~tucfy of stalutes. if 
the watchhirds will ~harpen their 
watch on lel!i~latlircs in actiun, if com-
mentators will ~et forlh ~alient !Juali-
fies or defccts of Icl!i~lulive products. 
the juclj!es will ~lIrdy make better liFe 
than they have of the statutes revolving 
in common-law orhils, Then benefits 
will flow in every .Iircction. pro bono 
1111 {:o, pro bono Il "[lI'rlo, but above all 
110 PUllC J.)llI1·~] pro lege et grege. 
• Tll\I!\, I hope I have given you a 
small sample oC Roger J. Traynor's 
map:nificent pro!\e. It flows so beauli· 
fully and with biblical quality. 
Hoger Traynor. who once tau;:::ht 
law. is still a scholar at heart. He has 
put his learning to such good use that 
today we must rate him a8 our master 
legal phrase-maker, even 88 we did 
Cardozo yesterday. What a beautiful 
writer! 
104,0 American Bar A8sociation Journol 
